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ABSTRACT 
Recent accounts from researchers, journalists, as well as federal investigators, reached a unanimous 
conclusion: social media are systematically exploited to manipulate and alter public opinion. Some 
disinformation campaigns have been coordinated by means of bots, social media accounts controlled by 
computer scripts that try to disguise themselves as legitimate human users. In this study, we describe one 
such operation occurred in the run up to the 2017 French presidential election. We collected a massive 
Twitter dataset of nearly 17 million posts occurred between April 27 and May 7, 2017 (Election Day). We 
then set to study the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign: By leveraging a mix of machine learning and 
cognitive behavioral modeling techniques, we separated humans from bots, and then studied the activities 
of the two groups taken independently, as well as their interplay. We provide a characterization of both the 
bots and the users who engaged with them, and oppose it to those users who didn't. Prior interests of 
disinformation adopters pinpoint to the reasons of scarce success of this campaign: the users who engaged 
with MacronLeaks are mostly foreigners with preexisting interest in alt-right topics and alternative news 
media, rather than French users with diverse political views. Concluding, anomalous account usage patterns 
suggest the possible existence of a black-market for reusable political disinformation bots. 
INTRODUCTION 
Social media have been extensively praised for their power to democratize online conversation. Whether in 
the context of civil movements (Howard, et al., 2011; González-Bailón, et al., 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 
2012; González-Bailón, et al., 2013; Tufekci, 2014; Bastos, et al., 2014), political outreach (Bond, et al., 
2012; Bakshy, et al., 2015), public health interventions (Centola, 2010; Dredze, 2012; Korda & Itani, 2013), 
or situational awareness (Sasaki, et al., 2010; Merchant, et al., 2011; Signorini, et al., 2011; Paul & Dredze, 
2011), platforms like Twitter and Facebook play a central role in the modern information ecosystem. 
However, such powerful tools can also be abused for nefarious purposes (Ferrara, 2015): Extremist groups 
use social media for radical propaganda and recruitment efforts (Ferrara, 2017); stock market manipulators 
have created concerted efforts to game financial systems (Ferrara, 2015); conspiracy groups orchestrate 
campaigns to distribute fake scientific articles to support anti-vaccination and other anti-science movements, 
creating massive public health issues (Bessi, et al., 2015; Del Vicario, et al., 2016). Of great concern for 
democracy is another form of social media manipulation: The rise of popularity of bots and disinformation 
in the context of political propaganda (El-Khalili, 2013; Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Ferrara, et al., 2016; Shorey 
& Howard, 2016; Kollanyi, et al., 2016; Marwick & Lewis, 2017).  
Researchers warned about the potential for abuse of the social media ecosystem for political propaganda a 
decade ago (Howard, 2006; Hwang, et al, 2012). The earliest reports of coordinated attacks against political 
candidates on social media date back to 2010 (Metaxas & Mustafaraj, 2012; Ratkiewicz, et al., 2011a; 
Ratkiewicz, et al., 2011b). Since then, an increasing account of such events has been recorded in the context 
of several elections, both in the United States (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Kollanyi, et al., 2016; Shorey & 
Howard, 2016; Wolley, 2016; Wolley & Howard, 2016; Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Wang, et al., 2017), and 
all over the world, including in South America (Forelle, et al., 2015; Suárez-Serrato, et al., 2016), the U.K. 
(Howard & Kollanyi, 2016), and Italy (Cresci, et al., 2017). One common trait of these campaigns is the 
adoption of automation tools to generate large volume of social media posts to support, or attack, candidates.  
Although automated social media accounts, referred to as social bots or sock puppets, have in some 
instances been used for social good (Savage, et al., 2016; Mønsted, et al., 2017; Shirado, & Christakis, 
2017), in this study we will refer exclusively to those used with the intent to deceive and manipulate. 
Another form of artificial support expressed on social media is via fake followers, often inactive accounts 
that are only used to increase the online popularity and/or visibility (e.g., the followership) of a public figure 
(Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Fake followers are not subject of this study due to their inactivity. 
On the onset of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, a rather new phenomenon was observed, in concert with 
social bots and hyper-partisan campaigns: the spread of fake news and the coordination of disinformation 
campaigns (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Mele, et al., 2017). The adoption of 
automated devices such as social bots in the context of disinformation campaigns is particularly concerning 
because there is the potential to reach a critical mass large enough to dominate the public discourse and 
alter public opinion (Ferrara, et al., 2016; Woolley & Howard, 2016; Marwick & Lewis, 2017); this could 
steer the public’s attention away from facts and redirecting it toward manufactured, planted information.1 
In this paper, we focus on another pivotal recent political event, namely the 2017 French presidential 
election of May 7, 2017. We aim to describe the social media dynamics related to one potentially disruptive 
disinformation campaign that occurred in the run up to the election, known as “MacronLeaks”. In the 
following, we provide a brief account of the events related to MacronLeaks as they unfolded.  
The popular 4chan.org message board hosts several large yet ephemeral discussion threads. A popular board 
is the “/pol/” (i.e., politics) community. Partly due to its anonymity features, partly because inactive 
discussion threads are quickly and automatically archived by the platform itself, 4chan.org has been 
reportedly functioning as an effective incubator of alt-right and alt-right online communities, most 
prominently in the United States (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Among the threads related to the 2017 French 
election, the most popular was one centered around coordinating cyber-attacks aimed at reveling sensitive 
information about then-presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron (En Marche!, 2017).  
Significant user participation guaranteed the generation of a wealth of allegedly incriminating material: 
while most documents were manufactured and their false nature was easily identifiable,2 on Friday May 5, 
2017 one user anonymously shared an email dump containing “Correspondence, documents, and photos 
from Macron and his team.”3 Shortly after its appearance, a link to the “/pol/” anonymous post was shared 
on Twitter by alt-right activist Jack Posobiec, which contributed to amplify the ongoing disinformation 
campaign object of this study.4 Ultimately, the leaked documents were shared on Twitter by WikiLeaks’ 
official account itself, although with the disclosure that their authenticity was unverified – this made the 
campaign go viral. 
DEFINING DISINFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS STUDY 
The notion of “disinformation campaign” used in this work warrants a rigorous definition. We consider 
MacronLeaks an instance of disinformation as it exhibited two necessary ingredients namely, first, the 
unverified nature of the shared information, and second the coordinated effort behind its sharing.  
The unverified nature of the leaked documents make this information qualify for the traditional definition 
of “rumor” (Allport & Postman, 1947). The documents circulated online have been referred to as evidence 
of Macron’s tax frauds and other illicit activities. The accuracy and relevance of these leaked documents 
has been extensively debated for weeks after the fact. The conclusion from official investigations is that, 
although the leaked documents were not manufactured, there is no evidence to support the allegations: most 
of the conclusions drawn by the 4chan.org communities were based on erroneous translation from French, 
as well as biased interpretations (or trivial misunderstanding) of French law (En Marche!, 2017). 
The voluntary spreading of a rumor by means of an orchestrated effort makes it a disinformation campaign 
(Del Vicario, et al., 2016). In this case, 4chan.org served as incubator for the initial attempt to smear the 
candidate by manufacturing, planting, or leaking allegedly incriminating documents. In addition, one major 
finding of this work, that we will discuss in detail later, is the uncovering of a social bot operation that 
occurred in the run up to Election Day aimed at amplifying even further the viral sharing of disinformation 
and email leaks. 
SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
In the rest of this manuscript, we will detail the methodological approaches to data collection and analysis, 
and discuss the findings and contributions of this work, which we summarize as follows: 
• We monitored the Twitter stream between April 27 and May 7, 2017 (Election Day), and collected 
a very large dataset containing nearly 17 million tweets related to the 2017 French presidential 
election. Within it, we identified the subset related to the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign. 
• By exploiting combinations of machine learning techniques and cognitive behavioral modeling, we 
identified humans and social bots participating to the campaign. We studied the characteristics of 
both classes of users independently, as well as their interplay.  
• We discovered that prior user interests reveal the reasons of scarce success of the MacronLeaks 
campaign: the users who engaged with it were mostly foreigners belonging to the alt-right Twitter 
community, rather than French users (i.e., potential voters).  
• Finally, we uncovered that accounts used to support then-presidential candidate Trump before the 
2016 U.S. election have been brought back from a limbo of inactivity (since November 2016) to 
join the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign. Such anomalous usage patterns point to the 
possible existence of a black-market for reusable political-disinformation bots. 
METHODS 
DATA COLLECTION 
By following a consolidated strategy, which we previously used to study the 2016 U.S. Presidential election 
(Bessi and Ferrara, 2016), we manually selected a set of hashtags and keywords. The list by construction 
contains a roughly equal number of terms associated with each of the two candidates, namely Marine Le 
Pen and Emmanuel Macron, and various general election-related terms: we finally defined 23 terms, listed 
in Table 1. The compilation of this list was also informed by early reports by Oxford researchers about the 
most prominent election-related terms (Desigaud, et al., 2017; Howard, et al., 2017).  
We monitored the Twitter stream and collected data by using the Twitter Search API, from April 27 to the 
end of election day, on May 7, 2017: this allowed us to uninterruptedly collect all tweets containing any of 
the search terms. The data collection infrastructure ran inside USC servers to ensure resilience and 
scalability. We chose to use the Twitter Search API (https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public/search) to make 
sure that we obtained all tweets that contain the search terms of interest posted during the data collection 
period, rather than a sample of unfiltered tweets: this precaution avoids incurring in known sampling issues 
related to collecting data using the Twitter Stream API (https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview) rather 
than the Twitter Search API (Morstatter, et al., 2013). 
This procedure yielded a large dataset containing approximately 17 million unique tweets, posted by 
2,068,728 million unique users. The timeline of the volume of posted tweets, down to the resolution of 
minutes, is illustrated in Figure 1 – and it will be discussed more thoroughly in the Data Analysis section. 
Within this set, we further identified the subset of tweets associated with the MacronLeaks campaign. Using 
the reports from various news articles as well as by manual inspection, we used the following key terms to 
isolate tweets belonging to the campaign: #MacronLeaks, #MacronGate, #SortonsMacron, #Bayrougate, 
and #RejoignezMarine. All tweets containing any such terms constitute the MacronLeaks corpus that we 
will analyze in detail in this work. Nearly 350 thousand such tweets exist, out of about 17 million overall 
tweets, making the MacronLeaks campaign a small drop (i.e., about 2% of the total) in the ocean of 
information regarding the presidential election. Overall, 99,378 users posted tweets in the MacronLeaks 
corpus. 
BOT DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
One of the most daunting tasks in social media analysis is determining whether a user account is controlled 
by a human or a software (i.e., a bot). A great deal of research aims to address this issue, including our own 
efforts (Ferrara, et al., 2016; Varol, et al., 2017) and others’ (Messias, et al., 2013; Yang, et al., 2014; Gilani, 
et al., 2015; Subrahmanian, et al., 2016). 
In this realm, Botometer6 (formerly BotOrNot) represents, as of today, the only openly accessible solution 
(Davis, et al., 2016). It consists of an Application Programming Interface (API) developed in Python which 
allows to programmatically interact with the underlying machine learning system. Botometer has been 
proven quite accurate in detecting social bots (Davis, et al., 2016; Varol, et al., 2017),   
However, the public interface of Botometer has two limitations that prevented us to use it in this project: 
the framework relies on the Twitter API to collect recent data about the accounts to inspect. The Twitter 
API imposes very strict query rate limits, therefore making it impossible to analyze more than a few 
thousand accounts with the public Botometer Python API. In this study, our goal is to detect bots in a very 
large population of over 2 million users, requiring an ad hoc large-scale bot detection solution. The second 
limitation is once again derived by the Twitter API: when Botometer inspects an account that has been 
either suspended, protected, quarantined, or deleted, the Twitter API does not provide any details about it, 
rendering Botometer unable to make any determination. Since this study will show that a significant portion 
of bot accounts involved in MacronLeaks has been either suspended, quarantined, or deleted shortly after 
Election Day (May 7, 2017), Botometer would not represent a suitable tool to analyze them. 
OUR BOT DETECTION APPROACH 
For the reasons mentioned above, we decided to implement a simple yet accurate bot-detection algorithm 
reflecting the following requirements:  
• The algorithm is accurate yet scalable and can be used to classify the over 2 million users present 
in our dataset in a reliable yet timely manner; this will address the scalability issues of Botometer. 
• The algorithm can use historical tweets and account metadata collected and available in our dataset 
to determine bots and humans, without the need to query the Twitter API for recent data; this will 
address the limits imposed by the Twitter API and allow us to analyze all users, not only the active 
ones at the time of inspection, but also the suspended, protected, quarantined, and deleted accounts. 
• The algorithm builds on top of the insights and lessons learned from the development of Botometer. 
Botometer’s underlying machine-learning framework generates a set of over one thousand features, 
spanning content and network structure, temporal activity, user profile data, and sentiment analysis. These 
indicators are aggregated and analyzed to determine the likelihood that the inspected account is a bot. 
Feature analysis revealed that the two most important classes of feature to detect social bots are the metadata 
and usage statistics associated with a user account (Davis, et al., 2016; Varol, et al., 2017). We previously 
illustrated (Bessi and Ferrara, 2017) that the following indicators provide the strongest signals to separate 
humans from, in particular, political bots: (i) whether the public Twitter profile looks like the default one 
or it is customized (it requires human efforts to customize a profile, therefore bots are more likely to exhibit 
the default setting); (ii) absence of geographical metadata (humans often use smartphones and the Twitter 
iPhone/Android App, which records the physical location of the mobile device as digital footprint); and, 
(iii) activity statistics such as total number of tweets and frequency of posting (bots exhibit incessant activity 
and excessive amounts of tweets), proportion of retweets over original tweets (bots retweet contents much 
more frequently than generating new tweets), proportion of followers over followees (bots usually have 
less followers and more followees), the number of times a user has been added to a public list – human 
users are often considered more influential (Aral, & Walker, 2012) and their content more “contagious” 
(Kramer, et al., 2014; Ferrara & Yang, 2015a; Ferrara & Yang, 2015b; Mønsted, et al., 2017), etc.  
DETECTION ALGORITHM AND FEATURES 
Considering these insights, we used the following user metadata and activity features to create a simple yet 
effective bot detection algorithm:7 
1) “statuses_count”: number of tweets posted by the given user; 
2) “followers_count”: number of followers of the given user; 
3) “friends_count”: number of followees (friends) of the given user; 
4) “favourites_count”: number of favorited tweets of the given user; 
5) “listed_count”: number of times the given user has been added to a list; 
6) “default_profile”: binary field that indicates whether the user profile has the default setting or not; 
7) “geo_enabled”: binary field that indicates whether the geo-coordinates of the user are available; 
8) “profile_use_background_image”: binary field that indicates whether the user profile has the 
default image or a custom one; 
9) “verified”: binary field that indicates whether the account has been verified by Twitter; verified 
accounts are considered to belong without doubt to humans.8 
10) “protected”: binary field that indicates whether the account has been set as protected.9 
As for machine learning models, we tested a variety of algorithms readily available in the Python toolbox 
named scikit-learn (Pedregosa, et al., 2011).  
In line with the considerations above, we considered the ability of the algorithms to deal with large datasets, 
which excluded some computationally more demanding algorithms (e.g., Support Vector Machines) and 
we benchmarked the following methods: Logistic Regression, Decision Trees, various ensemble methods 
(Random Forests, AdaBoost, ExtraTrees, etc.), K-nearest neighbors, Stochastic Gradient Descent, and 
finally two-layer neural networks. 
For performance evaluation, we used two standard metrics commonly adopted in machine learning research, 
namely accuracy and AUC-ROC (Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve) (Bishop, 2016). 
Both scores range between zero and one, the larger the better, with one indicating perfect classification. 
We set up a traditional supervised learning task, constituted of three phases, namely models’ training, 
validation (a.k.a. performance evaluation), and finally, classification of the users in the Twitter French 
election dataset.  
The first step required us to train each model with labeled examples of the two classes of users to detect 
(i.e., humans and bots). To this purpose, we used two datasets containing over five thousand of positive 
(bots) and negative (humans) examples of Twitter users in each category. The former training dataset is 
associated with Botometer (Varol, et al., 2017); the latter one is a labeled dataset provided by Cresci and 
collaborators (Cresci, 2017).  
For performance evaluation, to calculate the accuracy and AUC-ROC scores of all models, we used the 
approach of 10-fold cross-validation. This procedure splits the training data into ten equally-sized sets of 
data-points (preserving the balance of positive and negative data-points of the original dataset): one of these 
folds is hold out for validation (i.e., performance evaluation) and the remainder are used for training the 
models (the procedure is iterated 10 times, each holding out a different fold, and then averaging the accuracy 
and AUC-ROC scores obtained across the ten rounds of cross validation).  
All models achieved very good performance, above 80% in both accuracy and AUC-ROC scores. The top 
three models in terms of performance were Random Forests (93% accuracy, 92% AUC-ROC), AdaBoost 
(92% accuracy and AUC-ROC), and Logistic Regression (92% accuracy, 89% AUC-ROC). The latter also 
was over one order of magnitude faster than nearly any other model (only Stochastic Gradient Descent was 
comparable in terms of speed but significantly worse in terms of performance).  
For the reasons above, we decided to use Logistic Regression as reference model for bot detection purposes 
in the rest of this study. We retrained a full Logistic Regression model on the ten, simple metadata and 
activity features described above, using all the available labeled training data. Finally, we used it to classify 
all two million users in the Twitter French election dataset. An in-depth analysis of our findings follows. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND ONLINE DISCUSSION DYNAMICS  
We start by exploring the timeline of the general election-related discussion on Twitter. The broader 
discussion that we collected concerns the two candidates, Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron, and spans 
the period from April 27 to May 7, 2017. The discussion revolves around the 23 key terms listed in Table 
1 (Desigaud, et al., 2017; Howard, et al., 2017) and accounts for roughly 16.65 million tweets.  Figure 1 
illustrates the timeline of the volume of such tweets, at the granularity of the minute, and with GMT-0 time 
zone alignment. Let us discuss first the dashed grey line (left axis): this shows the volume of generic 
election-related discussion. Note that the presidential election occurred on May 07, 2017. The discussion 
exhibits common circadian activity patterns and a slightly upwards trend in proximity to Election Day. 
Some spikes do occur, namely on May 3 and on May 7, 2017. Aside from the obvious uptake in discussion 
on Election Day (i.e., spike on May 7) driven by the offline events, the previous spike occurred at night 
time on May 3, 2017 again in response to an offline event, namely after the televised political debate that 
saw Le Pen facing Macron.10 Otherwise, the number of tweets per minute averages between 300 and 1,500 
during the day, and quickly approaches de facto zero overnight, consistently throughout the entire 
observation window.  
Figure 1 also illustrates with the purple solid line (right axis) the volume associated with MacronLeaks. 
One should first note that the volume is nearly an order of magnitude lesser than the general election-related 
discussion. However, the temporal pattern of this campaign is substantially different from the general 
conversation. First, the campaign is substantially silent for the entire period till early May. We can easily 
pinpoint to the inception of the campaign on Twitter, which occurs in the afternoon of April 30. After that, 
a surge in the volume of tweets, peaking at nearly 300 per minute, happens in the run up to Election Day, 
between May 5 and May 6, 2017. It has been already reported by prior research (Metaxas & Mustafaraj, 
2012) that such disinformation campaigns peak between one and two days before elections. It is also worth 
noting that such a peak is nearly comparable in scale to the volume of the regular discussion, suggesting 
that for a brief interval of time (roughly 48 hours) the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign acquired 
significant collective attention, which in turn could have potentially had disastrous effects in terms of public 
opinion manipulation.  
To understand the main topics of conversation and the main actors therein involved, in Table 2 and Table 
3 we report the list of top 20 hashtags and mentioned users, respectively, with the associated number of 
tweets produced during our observation window. From Table 2 we can observe that many terms that we 
used as keywords for data collection appear highly ranked in this list as well (cf. Table 1). Macron canalized 
by far the largest volume of tweets, with #Macron appearing in over 1.5 million tweets. Comparatively, the 
official hashtags of Marine Le Pen, namely #LePen, accrued less than one third of that. Macron’s prominent 
presence in the discussion was due in part to organic attention, and in part because of disinformation: 
#MacronLeaks and #MacronGate, the two main hashtags related to the disinformation campaign, feature 
prominently in this top 20 list and appear cumulatively in about 350,000 tweets in our dataset. More details 
about this appear in the next section. Finally, the list demonstrates the high quality of our data collection 
strategy: all hashtags in the list are strictly related to the election conversation (we manually scrutinized up 
to the top 100 hashtags and results are consistent with very little noise added as we go down the ranking).  
As far as the top mentioned users, the ranking is intuitively led by the two official accounts of the candidates, 
with Macron accruing nearly 30% more mentions than Le Pen. Several accounts follow, divided by a large 
gap. The list includes:  
• Other prominent politicians such as Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Florian Philippot, Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon, Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, and even US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, as well 
as several official party Twitter accounts. 
• Traditional news media accounts, including news channels like BFMTV, Quotidien (@qofficiel), 
as well as prominent journalists like Hugo Clément. 
• American alt-right media personalities like InfoWars’ editor Paul Joseph Watson (@prisonplanet), 
alt-right activist and The Rebel’s correspondent Jack Posobiec, as well as WikiLeaks. All these 
actors were prominently involved with sharing and discussing the MacronLeaks contents. 
In the next two sections, we will focus on the MacronLeaks campaign and study social bot operations and 
characteristics; afterwards, we will describe the behaviors of human and bot users as well as their 
interactions. These analyses will shed light on the dynamics of the MacronLeaks disinformation operations. 
MACRONLEAKS BOTS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS  
By using a Logistic Regression model trained on the ten metadata and activity features described above, 
we obtain very accurate user classification on the cross-validated tests (92% accuracy, 89% AUC-ROC). 
We adopted this model to detect all bots and separate them from human users in our dataset. In the following, 
however, we will focus exclusively on the MacronLeaks corpus, the subset of our Twitter data that contains 
nearly 350,000 tweets posted by nearly one hundred thousand distinct users.11  
Out of 99,378 users involved in MacronLeaks, our model classified 18,324 of them as social bots, and the 
remainder of 81,054 as human users. The fraction of social bots amounts for about 18% of the total users 
involved in the campaign, which is extremely consistent with results from previous studies – e.g., our 
analysis of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election uncovered that roughly 15% of the users involved in the 
Twitter conversation were bots, and accounted for about 20% of the total tweets (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016).  
To provide a rigorous and thorough assessment of the quality of the bot detection results, next we provide 
first some examples of the results generated by our bot detection model (cf. Table 4), and then a broader 
statistical characterization of the distinctive features exhibited by the bots as opposed to human users. 
Table 4 shows the list of the top 15 Twitter accounts detected as social bots in the MacronLeaks corpus by 
our Logistic Regression model. They are sorted by the number of tweets they posted during our observation 
window. We manually investigated the status of these accounts at the time of our investigation (end of May 
2017):  The column “Status” reports whether the accounts are still active, or otherwise they have been 
deleted by the owner, or suspended or “quarantined” by Twitter.12 Whether an account has been deleted, 
suspended, or quarantined, it is a strong indicator that the account has been involved in activities in violation 
of Twitter’s Terms of Service: for example social bots, when detected by the platform’s algorithms, get 
systematically shut down; users who share information incompatible with Twitter’s ToS can get reported 
by others, then scrutinized by Twitter’s anti-abuse team, and suspended or quarantined if found in violation. 
Remarkably, among the top 15 social bots detected by our framework, 4 accounts have been so far deleted, 
7 have been suspended, and 2 have been quarantined by Twitter. Two accounts are still active, and they 
may be the result of misclassification. Overall, this example of manual verification suggests that we 
obtained 13 correct bots out of 15 detected, an accuracy of nearly 87% which is compatible with the cross-
validation benchmark (92% accuracy, 89% AUC-ROC). Further inspection of highly-ranked accounts is 
consistent with this accuracy performance. 
In general, we have already extensively observed in our prior work how detecting bots “in the wild” is a 
much more challenging task than traditional machine learning “exercises” where performance is measured 
on validation test sets for which labels are known (Ferrara, et al., 2016; Varol, et al., 2017). This discrepancy 
happens for a couple of reasons, most prominently because oftentimes bots used during traditional training-
validation benchmarks are of the same or similar types, while in the wild (i.e., in the real Twitter world) 
one can expect that thousands of variants of social bots may exist. Our detection framework seems to 
perform well in real-world detection. We hypothesize that this happens for two reasons. First, the 
framework benefits from its simplicity: Logistic Regression is a very simple linear model, and we limit the 
model to learn only over ten user metadata and activity feature, so overfitting issues are limited). Second, 
to train our models we used a mixture of various types of bots provided by multiple studies (Varol, et al., 
2017; Cresci, et al., 2017). 
Let us provide some characteristics of the 13 hand-verified bots in Table 4:  
• All accounts exhibit a disproportionate number of tweets containing the MacronLeaks keywords, 
generated over the first week of May 2017.  
• 12 out of 13 bots (all except @Yhesum) appear to have a very limited number of followers, 
suggesting that their creators did not emphasize the importance of the social network dimension, 
which has proven to be a central component of success and influence of bot operations in prior 
studies (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; Ferrara, et al., 2016). The only exception (@Yhesum) instead 
appears to adopt the well-known automatic reciprocal follow-back strategy (i.e., retaining as friends 
who follow back an automatically-initiated bot followership), as suggested by the very large and 
balanced number of friends and followers (nearly ten thousand). 
• Two suspicious groups of bot accounts with similar names appear:  
o A first class of bots is named *2020 (where * is a randomly generated name, e.g., 
gunbuster2020, dixneuf2020, etc.). Four such “2020” bots appear in the top 15 and they all 
exhibit similar activity statistics. Further manual scrutiny revealed the existence of three 
additional “2020” bots in the MacronLeaks corpus, which were less active but still identical 
in behavioral patterns to the four in the top 15 list. 
o A second class of bots is named *_1337 (where * is a randomly generated name, e.g., 
Geoff_1337 and jerry_1337). Further scrutiny revealed the existing of five other “_1337” 
less active bots. It is worth noting that 1337 spells leet, which stands for “elite” and 
represents an alternative alphabet that is primarily used by hacking internet communities.13 
In the Discussion and Conclusions section, we will present some additional insights about our findings 
related to the activity and characteristics of some of the bots we discovered. We will show some evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that online markets of reusable political disinformation bots may exist:14 some 
of the bot accounts we uncovered were created at the beginning of November 2016, shortly before the 2016 
U.S. Presidential election, and used only for a week to support of alt-right narratives; then they “went dark”, 
showing no activity till early May, in support of alt-right agenda and the MacronLeaks disinformation 
campaign in the context of the 2017 French Presidential election. Evidence of such devices being in other 
contexts, e.g., in case of crises, has been already reported (Starbird, et al., 2014; Nied, et al., 2017). 
We enrich our analysis by providing a statistical characterization of the discovered bots, and we contrast it 
to the accounts identified as human users by our framework. To this purpose, in Figure 2 and Figure 3 we 
show two boxplot distributions of the activity and metadata features respectively of the human users and 
the social bots present in the MacronLeaks Twitter corpus. We focus only on the five discrete features, 
namely number of tweets (statuses_count), number of followers (followers_count), number of friends 
(friends_count), number of favorites (favourites_count), and number of times listed (listed_count); thus, we 
exclude the other five binary features, i.e., default_profile, geo_enabled, profile_use_background_image, 
verified, and protected. 
Some strong statistical differences clearly emerge: Along all dimensions, the social bots involved in 
MacronLeaks appear as less active than the human users. Pairwise comparisons between bots and humans 
of the distributions of these five features yield additional insights: 
• Bots posted on average 2.86 MacronLeaks-related tweets (s = 10.3), while humans posted 3.81 (s 
= 9.68). A t-test and a Mann-Whitney test yield respectively p-values of 10-18 and 3-80. 
• Bots obtained on average 1,382 followers (s = 22,282), while humans have 2,510 (s = 28,542). T-
test and Mann-Whitney test score respectively p-values of 3-05 and zero. 
• Bots friended on average 1,058 users (s = 12,190), while humans have on average 1,403 friends 
(s = 3,656). T-test and Mann-Whitney yield p-values of 2-04 and zero. 
• Bots favorited on average 228 tweets (s = 924), while humans have on average 13,774 favorites 
(s = 27,001). Both t-test and Mann-Whitney p-values are zero. 
• Finally, bots have been listed on average on 7.42 lists (s = 90.3) and humans instead on 77.64 (s 
= 560.2). T-test yields a p-value of 2-62 and Mann-Whitney a p-value of zero. 
All p-values indicate that the pairs of distributions differ statistically very significantly. It is worth noting 
that all distributions are broad and skewed, exhibiting a power-law like behavior. For a visual example, 
refer to Figure 6, which will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
These results warrant further discussion. Recent literature reported extensively on traditional types of social 
bots whose automated activity can be easily detected because it yields very high volumes of tweets, 
especially retweets, due to incessant posting and re-sharing operations (Ferrara, et al., 2016; Bessi & Ferrara, 
2016). These are historically considered effective strategies as they aim at flooding the platform with 
campaign-related contents and canalize collective attention. However, in the case of MacronLeaks the 
historic trend appears to be reversed: Bots seem to try “fly under the radars”, posting comparable or less 
content than humans in the same conversation. We hypothesize that this can be a strategy to avoid detection 
and suspension from the platform.   
We finally investigate whether any correlation between user activity and metadata emerge that could 
indicate further anomalous behavioral patterns in bots as opposed to human users. To this aim, in Figure 4 
we show the feature Pearson correlation heat maps for human users (top), and social bots (bottom figure) – 
exclusively for those accounts involved in the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign. Two very different 
pictures emerge: for human users (N = 81,054) no strong pairwise feature correlations occur, as measure 
by the Pearson correlation coefficient, except for a strong correlation (r = 0.79) between the number of 
followers a human user has and the number of times it appears in public lists (cf. Figure 4, top). These two 
features are intuitively correlated because more influential users with more followers are added to public 
lists more frequently than less influential users with fewer followers.  
A very different picture emerges from the pairwise feature correlation of bot accounts (N = 18,324). The 
strongest correlation (cf. Figure 4, bottom) appears between the number of friends and the number of times 
these bots appear in lists (Pearson coefficient r = 0.81): this indicates that the more users a bot follows the 
more often it appears in public lists of other users, suggesting a self-promotion mechanism commonly 
adopted by bots. The second strongest correlation emerges between the numbers of followers and friends 
(Pearson coefficient r = 0.65), indicating that on average the bots in the MacronLeaks corpus engage in 
automatic, reciprocal follower-friend links (one example of such behavior is the bot @Yhesum of Table 
4). To complete the cluster of correlated pairs of features, number of friends and favorites correlate with a 
coefficient r = 0.61, and number of favorites and list appearance correlate with a coefficient of r = 0.41, 
both indicating strong correlated patterns of systematic behavior in the bots. 
Overall, our analyses highlighted examples of bots involved in MacronLeaks as well as provided a 
statistical characterization of their activity and metadata features used by our framework to detect them. In 
the next section, we will explore more in detail the behavior of both bots and human users involved in 
MacronLeaks as well as their interactions. 
HUMAN AND BOT BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN-BOT INTERACTIONS 
Like in the previous section, we here first provide a temporal characterization of the Twitter activity, this 
time specifically related to MacronLeaks, for both bot and human accounts. In Figure 5, we show the 
timeline of the volume of tweets generated (granularity of one minute), respectively by human users (dashed 
grey line) and social bots (solid purple line), between April 27, 2017 and May 7, 2017, and related to 
MacronLeaks. The amount of activity is substantially very close to zero until May 5, 2017, in line with the 
first coordination efforts as well as the information leaks spurred from other social platforms like 4chan.org, 
as discussed in the introduction. Spikes in bot-generated content often appear to slightly precede spikes in 
human posts, suggesting that bots can trigger cascades of disinformation. At peak, the volume of bot-
generated tweets is comparable with the that of human-generated ones (the plot, however, does not 
differentiate between humans’ retweets of bot-generated content, as opposed to tweets organically 
generated by human users). 
Let us investigate human-bot interactions further, and specifically determine what are the characteristics of 
the bots that are more frequently retweeted. To this aim, in Table 5 we report a list of ten social bots 
frequently retweeted by human users. Intuitively, some accounts overlap with the list of most active bots 
reported in Table 4 – e.g., the @Yhesum bot, which we discussed extensively before, accrued many 
retweets. All the accounts in Table 5 are suspended, deleted, or quarantined by Twitter at the time of this 
writing (early June 2017): this corroborates the suspect that the accounts were involved in the incriminated 
activities. The examples of Table 5 warrant further discussion, which will allow us to dig more into the 
details of the strategies adopted by the bots and their effectiveness.  
For each of the example bot accounts appearing in Table 5, we calculated the number of followers these 
accounts had prior to MacronLeaks (more precisely, the first time they appear in our dataset) as opposed to 
at the end of the observation window (i.e., relative to their last tweet in our dataset). What emerges is that 
six out of ten bots accrued a significant and large number of followers during the MacronLeaks 
disinformation campaign. A few of these example accounts had zero or nearly no followers when they first 
appear in the conversation, and manual verification indicates that the accounts were explicitly created on 
purpose to disseminate MacronLeaks tweets. It is worth noting that being active in such a type of 
disinformation campaigns appears to be an effective strategy to accrue visibility: several accounts obtained 
thousands of followers – in our example bots of Table 5, we notice increases up to nearly fifteen thousand 
followers accumulated in the span of less than one week. Another interesting fact that is worth noting is 
that the number of retweets received by the bots does not seem to be strongly correlated with the total 
amount of MacronLeaks tweets posted by each bot. The effectiveness of these bots, if measured in terms 
of number of accrued retweets, appear to be independent of their sheer activity: this suggests that other 
factors, such as the position of the bots in the social network, the different types of messages they posted 
and their narratives and language, as well as the type of human targets they aim at influencing, are all 
ingredients that potentially play a role in bots’ strategies. 
To dig further into the type of users involved in MacronLeaks and contrast that to the users participating 
exclusively to the general election-related discussion, we extracted the most frequent words occurring in 
the tweets produced in these two corpora. In Table 6 we show as example the top 16 most frequent token 
terms (i.e., individual words obtained after removing stop words and other commonly occurring terms) 
occurring in the tweets of the two corpora. Excluding the names of the two candidates that are prominently 
featured in both corpora, by contrasting the two columns stark differences emerge: on the left side of Table 
6, which represents general-election frequent terms, we observe several French words that strongly relate 
to the upcoming voting, e.g., voter (to cast one’s vote, in French), vote (“to vote”, in French as in English), 
fait (fact, or event, in French), faire (“to do”, “to make”, “to take”, etc.), tout (all), Français (French), débat 
(debate), etc. On the right side of Table 6 we see no such a language characterization, which strongly 
suggests the fact that the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign was limited mostly to an English-speaking 
audience, and failed to percolate in the French-speaking Twitter community. The most frequent words 
speak along the directions of the main narrative that was tailored around the alleged illicit activities and tax 
frauds of the now-president Macron. Interestingly, the word campaign itself is prominently featured in 
fourth position with over twenty thousand distinct occurrences, suggesting the nature of the operation itself. 
To corroborate this hypothesis, we extracted the most frequent terms appearing in the self-reported profile 
description that Twitter users can decide to include in their accounts. By using the same filtering criteria, 
in Table 7 we report as example the top 16 word tokens ranked by frequency of appearance in the Twitter 
profiles of users involved respectively in MacronLeaks (right column) as opposed to exclusively in the 
general election-related discussion (left column). Table 7 provides again a staggeringly different picture: 
most words occurring in the profiles of users not involved in MacronLeaks campaigns are in French, while 
emblematically the top two key terms of MacronLeaks’ users are MAGA (“Make America Great Again”, 
the motto of US President Trump), as well as Trump itself. While the left column is suggestive of terms 
that individuals interested in French politics would likely adopt to describe themselves – politique (politics), 
patriote (patriot), Français (French), contre (against), gauche (left), droite (right), etc. – the right side 
features similar key terms in English (conservative, patriot, god, pro-, American, America, Christian, 
politics, anti-, life, supporter, country, etc.), which would clearly characterize a right-leaning English-
speaking, American audience. This suggests that the largest majority of users involved in MacronLeaks had 
prior interests in American politics, in right-wing narratives, and in alt-right political agenda. Manual 
inspection of many of these accounts confirmed this hypothesis; it also further revealed that some accounts 
labeled as bots involved in MacronLeaks were also active in the alt-right campaigns leading to the 2016 
U.S. Presidential election and were labeled as bots in our previous study as well (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). 
We next analyze the type of information sources that the users, respectively human and bots, most 
frequently referred to in their tweets. To this purpose, in Table 8 we show for illustrative example the list 
of the top 10 URLs that have been tweeted within the general election discussion. We will consider this as 
a baseline for comparison and contrast it to the top tweeted URLs shown in Table 9, and discussed later. 
Our extensive analysis highlighted that most URLs appearing in the general election-related discussion are 
of the following three types:  
1. Pointers to tweets of either presidential candidate, (Macron and Le Pen), or to tweets of other 
prominent politicians (e.g., Nicolas Dupont-Aignan); 
2. Pointers to articles published in established news media (Le Figaro, The Guardian, Le Monde); 
3. Pointers to influential users on external media channels (e.g., YouTube, etc.), as well as journalists 
and other influential users on Twitter. 
Let us look at the MacronLeaks corpus next. Table 9 shows the list of top 10 URLs tweeted within the 
MacronLeaks campaign. In stark contrast with the general election-related discussion, the list of top 
tweeted URLs contains a mix of: 
1. Links to hyper-partisan news outlets: the top tweeted URL points to a story appeared on The 
Gateway Pundit (an alt-right news media) claiming that leaked documents were original and 
credible. Other highly-tweeted stories appear again on The Gateway Pundit as well as on other alt-
right websites like Zero Hedge and GotNews and support the allegations of Macron’s financial 
frauds and illicit activities.  
2. Links to leaked data dumps: the second most tweeted URL is the link to the archive.is file that 
contains the data of the leaked documents; this file has been extensively circulated on other 
platforms like 4chan.org and was shared thousands of times on Twitter as well; and, finally, 
3. URLs pointing to fake news websites: some blogposts (e.g., on blogspot.dk) qualify as fake news 
as they seem to be designed exclusively for financial profit, rather than for political reasons, e.g., 
in the case of alt-right news media sites like Breitbart News, Infowars, The Gateway Pundit, etc. 
Pointers to fake news stories proliferate even further down the list of highly-retweeted URLs.s 
We conclude this analysis section by providing a statistical characterization of the corpus’ features. In 
Figure 6 we show two sets of probability distributions, relative to the MacronLeaks tweet corpus (cf., top 
figure), which contains 347 thousand tweets, and an equal-sized random sample of tweets related to the 
general French election discussion posted during the same period (cf., bottom figure).  
In this order, each plot shows:  
A. The distribution of the total number of tweets posted by each user in the given corpus;  
B. The distribution of number of total word tokens in the given tweet corpus; 
C. The distribution of number of total word tokens in the user profiles’ descriptions;  
D. The distribution of the number of tweets’ languages;  
E. The distribution of the number of distinct hashtags; 
F. The distribution of the number of distinct user mentions; and finally, 
G. The distribution of the number of distinct URLs, appearing in the corpus. 
Before contrasting the results for the two corpora, let us provide an intuitive explanation of these features.  
We considered the number of tweets as an indicator of volume of activity in a discussion: we hypothesize 
that in a bot-driven conversation, highly active accounts (due to automation) will contribute giving this 
distribution a fatter tail than in an organic discussion. 
The features B and C warrant an explanation on their construction: for each corpus (i.e., MacronLeaks and 
general discussion, respectively), we calculated the frequency of appearance of each word in the tweets (B) 
as well as in the user profile descriptions (C). Word distributions enjoy some characteristic distributions, 
e.g., the Zipf law that suggests that the ranked word frequency should obey a Zipfian distribution (Adamic, 
2000). Our intuition is that the heavier the fat tail of such a distribution, the less diverse a tweet corpus is 
(respectively, the user profiles appearing in it), because a fatter tail indicates the appearance of some 
extremely popular words (in either the tweets or the user profile descriptions).  
Feature D simply indicates how many different languages appear in a corpus, and the frequency of tweets 
in that language. A more diverse discussion should encompass more languages. We hypothesize that the 
ranking of the languages is also instrumental to determine the audience mainly involved in that discussion. 
The last three features, E, F, and G, indicate the number of distinct hashtags, user mentions, and URLs 
appearing in the given corpus. More diverse conversations will have lighter tails than discussions dominated 
by the pervasive frequency of some of these entities. 
Let us now discuss the findings that emerge from Figure 6, following the order of features presented above: 
for what concerns the distribution of the total number of tweets posted by each user in the two corpora (cf., 
distribution A, i.e., the solid blue line), we can see that in MacronLeaks the tail of the distributions reaches 
roughly 103, indicating the presence of some extremely prolific accounts (either human or bots); in contrast, 
such distribution characterizing the general discussion exhibits a smaller slope and thus peaks at around 
102, suggesting that only a minority of users posted more than one hundred tweets in the entire corpus. This 
is in line with the intuition that bot-driven discussion exhibit a fatter tail in the characteristic activity-related 
distributions (e.g., number of posted tweets per user). 
Distributions B (i.e., the dashed red line) and C (i.e., dashed orange line) are very similar one another in 
both corpora. These distributions reflect the frequency of occurrence of word terms, whose generation and 
interpretation have been extensively discussed above in reference to Table 6 and Table 7, which report 
examples of word token appearing in the tweets and in the users’ profile descriptions, respectively. Once 
again, the slopes of the curves relative to MacronLeaks is larger than that of the general discussion, 
suggesting the presence of more prominent words that appear more frequently in the tweets as well as in 
the profiles of users in MacronLeaks. This is consistent with the examples shown in Table 6 and Table 7, 
which nicely illustrate two byproduct effects of this phenomenon:  
1. The most frequent word in both rankings appears about 25% more in MacronLeaks than in the 
general discussion: “Macron” appears 133K times in MacronLeaks, but only 109K times in the 
general discussion; similarly, “MAGA” (top ranked in Table 7: right column) appears nearly 18K 
times in MacronLeaks’ user descriptions, as opposed to “France” (top ranked in Table 7: left 
column) that appears about 13K times in the profiles of general discussion users. 
2. As one scrolls down the ranking, given a position in the ranking, terms in MacronLeaks corpus tent 
to have higher frequencies of occurrence of equally ranked terms in the general election. For 
example, the tenth terms in Table 6 are fait, which appears 11,023 times in the general election-
related discussion, and fakes that appears 12,404 in MacronLeaks. Similarly, the twentieth terms in 
Table 7 are droite, which appears 3,871 times in the general discussion, and country that appears 
5,272 times in MacronLeaks. The same applies to nearly all entries in the rest of the rankings. 
These results corroborate our intuition that fatter distribution tails suggest less diversity in the tweet corpus, 
or in the profiles of the users therein appearing. In MacronLeaks this indicates the emergence of popular 
words strongly evocative of the corpus’ narrative and prominently featured by a relatively larger number 
of users with respect to the general election-related discussion. 
Yet in Figure 6, Distribution D provides a view into the diversity of languages feature in each corpus. 
Intuitively, a more diverse conversation that is more inclusive of a variety of groups, as well as that attracts 
international attention, would feature a larger number of languages. MacronLeaks once again shows a fatter 
tail suggesting that the conversation is less diverse in terms of languages given that many tweets appears in 
one extremely popular language. Further analysis reveals an interesting fact: in MacronLeaks, most tweets 
(N=177,695) are in English, while French is only second (N=135,397); in stark difference, in the equal-
sized random sample of general conversation, French emerges by far as the most prominent language 
(N=242,422), while English comes second with a large gap (N=73,409). This suggest that the main 
participants to MacronLeaks were not in the French-speaking community, but rather in the English-
speaking American user base. This may be one explanation associated with the scarce success of the 
disinformation campaign to affect French voters. 
Our analysis concludes with a summary of interpretations of the last three distributions, E, F, and G, which 
indicate the number of distinct hashtags, user mentions, and URLs respectively. For each of these 
distributions it is possible to observe systematically roughly one order of magnitude difference in favor of 
the MacronLeaks ones, which exhibit fatter tails indicating less diverse corpora whose tweets are dominated 
by fewer, more popular hashtags, mentions, and URLs, if contrasted with the general discussion. If one 
considers URLs, as an example, the results are reflected in Table 8 and Table 9 and a similar analysis 
regarding ranking and frequencies of the terms can be done as for what concerned distribution B and Table 
6 and Table 7: the top URLs in MacronLeaks are systematically more frequent than equally-ranked URLs 
in the general discussion.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we provided an extensive statistical analysis of the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign 
that occurred in the run up to the 2017 French presidential election. Using a mix of state-of-the-art machine 
learning techniques and cognitive heuristics for bot detection, in combination with data-driven insights, and 
considering a reconstruction of events as they unfolded, we uncovered some characteristics of the 
disinformation campaign, its main drivers, and its human audience. We contrasted these results against the 
general election-related conversation that we used as baseline to pinpoint to differences and anomalies. 
Our results highlighted a few interesting phenomena: first, we advanced the hypothesis that a black market 
of reusable political disinformation bots may exist. Similar suggestions have been advanced by other studies 
(Starbird, et al., 2014; Nied, et al., 2017); however, our work is the first to identify the presence of bots that 
existed during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election campaign period to support alt-right narratives, went dark 
after November 8, 2016, and came back into use in the run up days to the 2017 French presidential election. 
In conclusion, our findings also demonstrated that the prior interest of users engaged in MacronLeaks may 
be revealing of the reasons of scarce success of the campaign at affecting the French vote outcome: most 
of the audience of MacronLeaks campaign was the English-speaking American alt-right community, rather 
than French users; this is in stark contrast with the baseline general conversation, which involved 
systematically and significantly more French users (thus, likely French voters), which exhibited a clear 
trend in favor of supporting now-president Emmanuel Macron. 
In the future, we will try to draw similarities and differences in the context of computational political 
propaganda phenomena, focusing on a variety of elections and politics-related contemporary events to 
understand how online social media can be manipulated, and what are the quantifiable consequences of 
successful such attempts. 
  
NOTES 
1. While the exact dynamics of events in the context of the 2016 U.S. election at the time of this 
writing (June 2017) still remain unclear, and are subject of ongoing federal investigations, sufficient 
evidence has been mounting to support the idea that foreign governments, as well as organizations 
with vested interests, may have meddled with the election process, either via influence campaigns, 
or by means of spear phishing attacks aimed at stealing private information of voters either for 
retaliation and blackmailing purposes. 
2. See: https://www.cnet.com/news/macron-french-presidential-campaign-says-it-was-hacked/  
3. See: http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-39845105  
4. See: http://www.thedailybeast.com/the-twitter-bots-who-tried-to-steal-france 
5. See: https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/partisan-fb-pages-analysis  
6. Botometer is publicly available at: https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/  
7. We here use a nomenclature of tweets’ features consistent with that of the Twitter API; See official 
documentation as reference: https://dev.twitter.com/overview/api/tweets  
8. Twitter account verification process described at: https://support.twitter.com/articles/119135  
9. About public and protected tweets: https://support.twitter.com/articles/14016 
10. Timeline of events leading to the election: http://www.businessinsider.com/france-is-having-one-
of-its-strangest-presidential-elections-timeline-2017-5 
11. A broader analysis of social bot operations in the entire French election dataset is left for future 
work. This is mostly because a thorough validation of the bot classification results requires a 
significant amount of manual investigation for quality assurance. Therefore, scaling up the effort 
to very large corpora (in our case, 2 million users overall) requires significant additional resources. 
12. Twitter can take two different countermeasures toward suspicious accounts: the more radical 
solution is an account suspension, which yields the deletion of the account and all tweets ever 
posted by that user. A softer solution is the so-called “quarantine”: the given account is labeled as 
suspicious and users on the platform must go through an extra step of verification to access their 
content. The owner of a quarantined account can also try appeal to Twitter to get reinstated. 
13. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leet  
14. See: http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-bots-and-fake-accounts-2013-11  
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TABLES 
 
France2017 LePen JeVoteMacron EnMarche 
Marine2017 Le Pen JeVote MacronPresident 
AuNomDuPeuple MarineLePen Presidentielle2017 #France 
FrenchElection FrenchPresidentialElection ElectionFracaise @MLP_officiel 
FrenchElections JeChoisisMarine JamaisMacron @EmmanuelMacron 
Macron JeVoteMarine Macron2017  
Table 1. List of 23 keywords whose streams we continuously collected from April 27, 2017 to May 7, 2017. 
 
 
Hashtag No. Tweets Hashtag (cont.) No. Tweets (cont.) 
#Macron  1,521,425 #fn  127,336 
#Presidentielle2017  652,563 #JeVote  126,075 
#LePen  447,365 #Marine2017  119,274 
#France  378,234 #debat2017  118,069 
#2017LeDebat 273,304 #2017LeDébat  98,862 
#MacronLeaks  255,491 #MacronGate  93,235 
#MarineLePen  184,442 #JeVoteMacron  83,081 
#Whirlpool  170,347 #MacronPresident  72,184 
#EnMarche  128,613 #JamaisMacron  72,140 
#FrenchElection  127,705 #Elysee2017  59,421 
Table 2. List of top 20 hashtags and associated number of tweets produced between April 27, 2017 and 
May 7, 2017 (election day). 
  
Mention No. Tweets Mention (cont.) No. Tweets (cont.) 
@emmanuelmacron  1,284,627 @hugoclement  66,001 
@mlp_officiel  981,219 @enmarchefr  62,468 
@bfmtv  213,421 @hillaryclinton  61,982 
@dupontaignan  178,995 @marion_m_le_pen  61,651 
@prisonplanet  136,874 @sofiakkar  58,074 
@qofficiel  112,423 @v_of_europe  56,998 
@f_philippot  95,696 @jeunesmacron  54,927 
@jlmelenchon  89,334 @flwjrm  50,982 
@jackposobiec  76,419 @youtube  50,631 
@wikileaks  69,718 @tf1lejt  50,628 
Table 3. List of top 20 mentioned users, and associated number of tweets produced between April 27, 2017 
and May 7, 2017 (election day). 
  
Username Tweets Followers Friends Favorites Listed Status* 
Vote__Marine 737 9 61 85 0 DELETED 
DonTreadOnMemes 427 24 35 371 1 DELETED 
BrandonJBarber 328 4 135 0 1 DELETED 
Geoff_1337 286 14 13 19 0 SUSPENDED 
N********* 252 31 99 270 4 Active 
07_mai_2017 225 169 231 0 3 DELETED 
gunbuster2020 221 10 87 574 0 SUSPENDED 
dixneuf2020 213 15 81 570 0 SUSPENDED 
bluecanti2020 204 10 88 575 0 SUSPENDED 
shogouki2020 203 13 86 573 0 SUSPENDED 
D********* 199 2,515 1,676 77 29 Active 
Yhesum 191 9,476 9,599 223 96 SUSPENDED 
jerry_1337  152 5 12 0 0 SUSPENDED 
Subocean 102 26 87 9 3 QUARANTINED 
protegerlepeupl	 92	 1	 62	 60	 0	 QUARANTINED 
Table 4. List of the top 15 Twitter accounts detected as social bots by our algorithms and sorted according 
to the number of MacronLeaks posts they tweeted between April 27, 2017 and May 7, 2017 (election day). 
* The column “Status” reports whether, as of the date of this writing (end of May 2017), the account is 
active or is being suspended, deleted, or “quarantined” by Twitter. Out of the top 15 social bots detected by 
our framework, 4 accounts have been so far deleted, 7 have been suspended, and 2 have been quarantined 
by Twitter. Two accounts are still active (their usernames are redacted to preserve user privacy). 
  
 Username Retweeted Tweets Followers before Followers after  Status* 
Yhesum 291 786	 21	 9,476	 SUSPENDED 
lou_justine92 119 213	 219 2,297 DELETED 
trololo451 93 94 7 10 DELETED 
doubtallthought 43 431 377 1,833 QUARANTINED 
chadashworth 43 5 14,833 15,205 DELETED 
jewishhotjean 39 422 46 14,033 DELETED 
sebasqien 38 447 31	 6,633 DELETED 
blufor2 30 3 0 1 DELETED 
_loup_gar 29 65 2	 769 DELETED 
lerenardfrance 25 22 6	 16 DELETED 
Table 5. Ten examples of social bots frequently retweeted by human users. *All these accounts are 
suspended, deleted, or quarantined by Twitter at the time of this writing (early June 2017). 
  
Generic election-related discussion MacronLeaks campaign 
Token Frequency Token Frequency 
Macron  109,734 Macron  133,708 
Pen  80,789 French  28,668 
Marine  43,101 France  27,280 
France  24,971 campaign  22,585 
Emmanuel  15,793 emails  19,206 
French  13,463 Pen  15,463 
voter  13,094 WikiLeaks  14,493 
vote  11,394 documents  14,269 
plus  11,204 tax  12,591 
fait  11,023 fakes  12,404 
faire  9,237 election  12,159 
LePen  8,717 media  10,053 
election  7,311 leaked  9,643 
Français  6,535 vote  9,641 
tout  6,497 discovered  8,927 
débat  5,930 evasion  8,854 
Table 6. Top 16 most frequent token terms occurring in the tweets of users respectively active in the general 
election-related discussion or in the MacroLeaks campaign. 
  
Generic election-related discussion MacronLeaks campaign 
Token Frequency Token Frequency 
France  13,204 MAGA 17,853 
politique  7,731 Trump  17,796 
love  6,241 France  15,437 
patriote  5,578 love  12,345 
marine2017  5,576 conservative  10,657 
Trump  5,116 marine2017  8,503 
vie  5,104 patriot 8,280 
monde  5,041 marine  7,386 
tweets  4,874 god  7,297 
fan  4,713 proud  6,931 
Français  4,667 pro  6,880 
news  4,488 American  6,777 
contre  4,359 America  6,774 
anti  4,301 Christian  6,110 
gauche  4,247 politics  5,625 
Macron  4,187 anti  5,603 
Marine  4,105 fan  5,579 
EnMarche  3,997 life  5,414 
ans  3,944 supporter  5,332 
droite  3,871 country  5,272 
Table 7. Top 20 most frequent token terms appearing in the user account self-reported descriptions of users 
active respectively in the general election discussion, or in the MacronLeaks campaign. 
  
URL Frequency 
https://twitter.com/mlp_officiel/status/5968249560764416  1,064 
https://twitter.com/mlp_officiel/status/858932738942021632  470 
https://twitter.com/madamefigaro/status/860134337806835712  417 
https://twitter.com/dupontaignan/status/858033334521409536  411 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D6H0cjIN4gw  306 
https://twitter.com/MLP_officiel/status/858932738942021632  259 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/04/barack-obama-backs-macron-in-last-
minute-election-intervention  
243 
https://twitter.com/damienrieu/status/858265285991780352  213 
https://twitter.com/anneapplebaum/status/860872956498644992  191 
http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/05/03/des-intox-du-debat-entre-
emmanuel-macron-et-marine-le-pen-verifiees_5121846_4355770.html  
171 
Table 8. Top 10 URLs tweeted within the general election discussion (baseline). Most URLs are pointers 
to tweets of either presidential candidate, other prominent politicians (e.g., Nicolas Dupont-Aignan), or 
established news media (Le Figaro, The Guardian, Le Monde). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
URL Frequency 
http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2017/05/breaking-wikileaks-confirms-leaked-macron-
campaign-emails-authentic-macronleaks/  
3,018 
http://archive.is/eQtrm  2,766 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-04-25/meet-real-emmanuel-macron-consummate-
banker-puppet-bizarre-elitist-creation  
2,077 
http://gotnews.com/busted-macronleaks-show-feminist-hypocrite-emmanuelmacron-
pays-female-campaign-workers-26-less-men/  
1,943 
https://www.pscp.tv/w/a9nszjF4ZUtXeEdWcnJhalB8MUJkeFl2bWtwa0RLWI2X5c-
aHtYkbfBlqL9jLCqUAewt8H54OrqhULHt16_h  
1,780 
http://gotnews.com/emmanuel-macrons-tax-evasion-documents-real/  1,718 
http://disobedientmedia.com/new-leak-reveals-emails-documents-from-macron-and-
affiliated-staff-members/  
1,542 
http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2017/05/breaking-macron-busted-lied-tax-evasion-
4chan-pol-posts-images-macrons-off-shore-bank-account/  
673 
http://disobedientmedia.com/macron-denies-authenticity-of-leak-french-prosecutors-
open-probe/  
641 
https://diversitymachtfrei.blogspot.dk/2017/05/macron-leaks-contain-secret-plans-
for.html  
635 
Table 9. Top 10 URLs tweeted within the MacronLeaks campaign. The list contains a mix of links to hyper-
partisan news outlets (The Gateway Pundit, Zero Hedge, GotNews), leaked data dumps, and fake news 
websites. 
  
FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of the volume of tweets generated every minute during our observation period (April 
27, 2017 through May 7, 2017). The purple solid line (right axis) shows the volume associated with 
MacronLeaks, while the dashed grey line (left axis) shows the volume of generic election-related discussion. 
The presidential election occurred on May 07, 2017. 
 
 
Figure 2. Boxplot distribution of the metadata features of to the human users involved in the disinformation 
campaigns associated with MacronLeaks. 
 
 Figure 3. Boxplot distribution of the metadata features of the social bots detected by our framework and 
associated with the disinformation campaigns related to MacronLeaks. 
 Figure 4. Feature correlation heat maps for human users’ metadata (TOP), and social bots’ features 
(BOTTOM) involved in the disinformation campaigns associated with MacronLeaks. 
  
 Figure 5. Timeline of the volume of tweets generated every minute, respectively by human users (dashed 
grey line) and social bots (solid purple line), between April 27, 2017 and May 7, 2017, and related to 
MacronLeaks. Spikes in bot-generated content often slightly precedes spikes in human posts, suggesting 
that bots can trigger cascades of disinformation. 
 
 Figure 6. TOP: distributions of statistics calculated on the MacronLeaks tweet corpus (347K tweets); 
BOTTOM: statistics calculated on an equal-sized random sample of tweets related to the French election 
posted during the same period (April 27, 2017 through May 7, 2017). The plots show, in this order: (A) the 
distribution of the number of tweets posted by each user; (B) the distribution of number of total word tokens 
in the tweet corpus, as well as (C) in the user profiles’ descriptions; (D) the distribution of the number of 
tweets’ languages; the distribution of the number of distinct (E) hashtags, (F) user mentions, and finally 
(G) URLs, appearing in the corpus. 
